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THE PANDORA'S BOX OBJECTION TO SKEPTICAL THEISM 
Stephen  Law 
 
ABSTRACT: Skeptical theism is a leading response to the evidential 
argument from evil against the existence of God. Skeptical theists 
attempt to block the inference from the existence of inscrutable evils 
(evil for which we can think of no God-justifying reason) to 
gratuitous evils (evils for which there is no God justifying reason) by 
insisting that given our cognitive limitations, it wouldn't be surprising 
if there were God-justifying reasons we can't think of. A well-known 
objection to skeptical theism is that it opens up a skeptical Pandora’s 
box, generating implausibly wide-ranging forms of skepticism, 
including skepticism about the external world and past. This paper 
looks at several responses to this Pandora's box objection, including a 
popular response devised by Beaudoin and Bergmann. I find that all 
of the examined responses fail. It appears the Pandora's box objection 
to skeptical theism still stands. 
 
1. The skeptical theist response to the evidential argument from evil 
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Skeptical theism is currently one of the most popular1 theistic responses to 
the evidential argument from evil, a typical version of which is outlined 
below. 
 
Let an inscrutable evil be an evil that (even after careful reflection) we can 
think of no God-justifying reason for God, if he exists, to permit. And let a 
gratuitous evil be an evil there's no God-justifying reason for God, if he 
exists, to permit. Then an evidential argument from evil runs: 
 
(1) There are inscrutable evils. 
(2) Therefore, probably there are gratuitous evils. 
(3) God, if he existed, would not permit gratuitous evils. 
(4) Therefore, probably God does not exist. 
 
Skeptical theists challenge the inference from (1) to (2). They maintain our 
inability to think of a God-justifying reason for an evil does not allow us 
reasonably to conclude there probably is no such reason. Inferences of this 
form are often termed ‘noseeum’2. Noseeum inferences can be sound: the 
fact that I can’t see any elephants in my garage allows me reasonably to 
conclude there are probably no elephants there. However, I can’t 
reasonably conclude there are probably no insects in my garage given only 
the fact that I can’t spot any (looking in from the street). Given my 
                                                 
1 Proponents of a skeptical theist response to the evidential argument from 
evil include Alston (1991, 1996), Bergmann (2001, 2009), Fitzpatrick 
(1981), Howard-Snyder (1996a), McBrayer and Swenson (2012), Plantinga 
(1996), Segal (2011), van Inwagen (1996), and Wykstra (1984, 1996). 
2 After Wykstra (1996): ‘We don’t see ‘um so they probably ain’t there.’ 
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perceptual limitations, there might still easily be insects present. The 
skeptical theist maintains that, given our cognitive limitations, the 
inference from (1) to (2) is similarly flawed. Michael Bergmann, a leading 
defender of skeptical theism, puts the objection thus: 
 
The fact that humans can’t think of any God-justifying reason 
for permitting and evil, doesn’t make it likely that there are no 
such reasons; this is because if God existed, God’s mind would 
be far greater than our minds so it wouldn’t be surprising if God 
has reasons we weren’t able to think of. (2012: 11) 
 
According to Bergmann, the skeptical theist’s skepticism (detached from 
their theism) includes as a main ingredient endorsement of such skeptical 
theses as: 
 
ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we 
know of are representative of the possible goods there are. 
 
ST2: We have no good reason for thinking the possible evils we 
know of are representative of the possible evils there are. 
 
ST3: We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment 
relations we know of between possible goods and the permission of 
possible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are 
between possible goods and the permission of possible evils. 
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ST4: We have no good reason for thinking that the total moral value 
or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately 
reflects the total moral value or disvalue they really have. (2012: 11-
12) 
 
Bergmann maintains that, given the truth of ST1-ST4, we are simply in the 
dark about whether there exist God-justifying reasons to permit the evils 
we observe. But then the evidential argument from evil fails. 
 
2. The Pandora’s box objection to skeptical theism 
 
Skeptical theism has been criticised on the grounds that it opens up a 
skeptical Pandora’s box, generating forms of skepticism that are 
implausibly wide-ranging and strong. In particular, it is argued that 
skeptical theism requires we also embrace skepticism about the external 
world and the past.3 Why so? Well, how do we know God doesn’t have 
good reason to create a false impression of an external world, or good 
reason to create the false impression that the universe and myself are more 
than five minutes old? Skeptical theism blocks any attempt to justify the 
belief that there are unlikely to be such God-justifying reasons by means of 
a noseeum inference: ‘I can’t think of a good reason why God would 
deceive me in that way, therefore there probably is no such reason.’ But 
then skeptical theism would seem to have the consequence that, for all I 
                                                 
3 See for example Russell (1996), Gale (1996). 
 5 
know, God does indeed have a good reason to deceive me in this way and 
is deceiving me for that reason.  
 
Wilks points out one of the more outlandish skeptical consequences he 
supposes skeptical theism generates. He imagines an ‘eccentric theist’ who 
claims God has created a sub-10,000 year old Earth orbited by the sun, 
with pink elephants. When compelling scientific evidence against these 
claims is pointed out to our eccentric theist, he replies: ‘We cannot fathom 
God’s reasons. For all we know, God has good reason to present us with 
misleading evidence against these claims, despite their truth. But then I 
have been supplied with no good reason to suppose my claims about a sun-
orbited young earth with pink elephants are false.’ Wilks maintains that if 
skeptical theists are to be consistent, they should accept the reasonableness 
of this reply, and that if they do so, then 
 
theism comes off looking less rational than it did before the 
defense… [O]ne might as well spare the effort of dispute and 
simply pronounce belief in God to be irrational. (2009: 76) 
 
Call the suggestion that skeptical theism leads to such absurd skeptical 
consequences concerning the external world and past the Pandora’s box 
objection. My first aim in this paper is to spell out why one of the leading 
responses to this objection – a response made by, among others, Beaudoin 
and Bergmann – fails.  
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3. Bergmann and Beaudoin’s response to the Pandora’s box objection 
 
In response to the Pandora’s box objection, Bergmann appeals to what he 
calls commonsensism: 
 
Commonsensism: the view that (a) it is clear that we know many 
of the most obvious things we take ourselves to know (this 
includes the truth of simple perceptual, memory, introspective, 
mathematical, logical, and moral beliefs) and that (b) we also 
know (if we consider the question) that we are not in some 
skeptical scenario in which we are radically deceived in these 
beliefs. (2012: 10) 
 
Having defined commonsensism, Bergmann asks us to consider Sally, a 
hypothetical agnostic who endorses skeptical theses ST1-ST4 but who, 
given her commonsensism, can still know many things via perception and 
memory: 
 
Take for example her knowledge that she has two hands. Given 
Sally’s commonsensism – in particular, clause (b) – she knows, 
in addition to the fact that she has hands, that’s she’s not a brain 
in a vat being deceived into thinking she has hands. And 
similarly, she knows that if God exists, then God doesn't have an 
all-things-considered good reason for making it seems that she 
has hands when in fact she doesn’t. She knows this despite her 
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endorsement of ST1-ST4… By endorsing ST1-ST4, Sally is 
committing herself to the view that we don't know, just by 
reflecting on possible goods, possible evils, the entailment 
relations between them, and their seeming value or disvalue, 
what God’s reasons might be. But it doesn't follow that we have 
no way at all of knowing anything about what reasons God 
might have for doing things… In general, for all the things we 
commonsensically know to be true, we know that God, (if God 
exists) didn't have an all-things-considered good reason to make 
them false (2012: 15) 
 
Beaudoin suggests a similar move in response to the objection that 
skeptical theism entails skepticism about s, where s is the state of affairs in 
which God created an old-looking universe just five minutes ago. This 
objection, counters Beaudoin,  
 
presupposes that the basis on which any skeptical theist 
believes God does not actualize s is an… inference from ‘I 
can’t see what would justify God’s actualizing s’ to ‘probably 
there is no reason - probably God does not actualize s.’ This 
basis for believing that s does not obtain is unavailable to the 
skeptical theist… But the point is other… reasons… might still 
be available to the skeptical theist… Consider an analogy. 
Suppose I know nothing about Smith’s honesty, or lack thereof. 
For all I know, Smith is an inveterate liar. Now I claim to 
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believe something (P) Smith told me, but not on the basis of 
Smith’s telling me; instead I’ve confirmed with my own eyes 
that (P). Clearly in this case it wouldn’t do for someone to 
challenge the rationality of my belief by pointing out that for 
all I know Smith is a liar; my belief that (P) isn’t based on 
Smith’s testimony… Perhaps there is some theologically 
neutral, telling philosophical argument for rejecting skepticism 
about the past. If there is, then on this basis the skeptical theist 
can conclude that God has no [morally sufficient reason] for 
actualizing s, since he has not actualized it. (2005: 44-45) 
 
According to Bergmann and Beaudoin, then, given there are other ways of 
knowing about the external world and the past (ways that don’t rely on any 
noseeum inference regarding God’s reasons), skeptical theism constitutes 
no threat to such knowledge. But then, granted the fact that the skeptical 
theist does indeed possess knowledge of the external world and past, they 
can conclude that God has not, for some unknown reason, radically 
deceived them about such things. 
 
Call this the Bergmann/Beaudoin response to the Pandora’s box objection. 
As I explain below, the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails.  
 
4. Why the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails 
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In the terminology of epistemic defeat, the reason why skeptical theism 
might appear to require we embrace skepticism concerning the external 
world and past is that it appears to generate an undercutting defeater for all 
our beliefs grounded in perceptual experience and memory. A stock 
illustration of an undercutting defeater involves widgets on an assembly 
line. Given the widgets appear perceptually to me be red, I am prima facie 
justified in believing that they are red. However, if I'm subsequently 
informed by a reliable person that the widgets are illuminated by a red light 
(to reveal imperfections) that makes them appear red even if they are not, 
then, it’s suggested, I come to possess an undercutting defeater for my 
original belief. Why so? Well I now possess good grounds for thinking that 
the method by which I acquired by original belief, is, in the circumstances 
in which I formed it, unreliable and not to be trusted. 
 
But what, exactly, is defeated in such cases? Typically, it's supposed that 
justification, and thus knowledge, are defeated. On acquiring that new 
evidence about the red light, I can no longer be said either to justifiably 
believe or to know that the widgets are red.  
 
Now, it is controversial whether, in such a case, justification and 
knowledge really are lost. Lasonen Aarnio (2010) suggests that the 
intuition that knowledge is lost in such cases is often misleading. The 
implications of Lasonen Aarnio’s view for the Pandora’s box objection will 
be discussed towards the end of this paper. For argument's sake, I shall 
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accept for the time being that the widespread intuition that justification and 
knowledge are lost in such cases is indeed correct. 
 
Why suppose skeptical theism generates a defeater for beliefs about the 
external world and past? Well, given that it appears to me both that I ate 
toast for breakfast this morning and that there is an orange on the table in 
front of me, perhaps I am prima facie justified in believing I ate toast for 
breakfast and that there is an orange before me. But if I now learn that, (i) 
God exists, and (ii) for all I know, God has an all-things-considered good 
reason to deceive me about these things, then, runs the objection, I can no 
longer justifiably believe I had toast for breakfast or that there is an orange 
there. At the heart of the Pandora’s box objection lies the thought that, just 
as learning about that red light generates an undercutting defeater for the 
belief that the widgets are red, so learning that (i) and (ii) generates an 
undercutting defeater for beliefs about the external world and past. 
 
Consider what appears to be an analogous case.  
 
Olly’s orange. Suppose I see what appears to be an orange on the table in 
front of me. Let’s assume I'm thereby prima facie justified, and indeed can 
be considered commonsensically to know, that there’s an orange there. But 
suppose I then discover the following. Someone – call him Olly – 
possesses a holographic projector capable of producing entirely 
convincing-looking visual appearances onto the table in front of me. Now 
suppose the probability that Olly is using his projector is inscrutable to me. 
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Suppose, for example, that I learn Olly has an urn of balls. Prior to my 
observing the table, Olly selected a ball at random from this urn. If the ball 
was black, Olly projected an entirely convincing-looking holographic 
image of an orange onto the table. If Olly selected a non-black ball, he 
placed a real orange on the table. I have no clue concerning what 
proportion of balls in Olly’s urn are black. For all I know, all the balls are 
black, none are black, 50% are black, etc. I can’t reasonably assign any 
probability to any of these hypotheses. Thus I remain in the dark about 
whether Olly placed a real orange, rather than a holographic image of an 
orange, on the table. 
 
On being informed by a generally reliable source of this backstory to my 
experience, do I remain justified in believing there is an orange on the table 
before me? Can I be said to know there’s an orange there? Intuitively not4. 
Even if there’s a real orange before me, it appears I’m no longer justified in 
believing this. For all I know, I'm observing a holographic image. The 
backstory appears to provide me with an undercutting defeater for my 
belief that there is a real orange on the table, notwithstanding the fact that I 
might otherwise have been justified in believing, and indeed might 
otherwise have been considered commonsensically to know, that there’s an 
orange present.  
 
But suppose I now attempt to defend in the following manner (Beaudoin-
and-Bergmann-style) my belief that there’s an orange before me. Of course 
                                                 
4 As already noted, the accuracy of such intuitions has been question. I 
address this worry towards the end of this paper. 
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I don’t believe there’s an orange there because I suppose it’s unlikely Olly 
picked a black ball from his urn. Rather, I have some other way of knowing 
there’s an orange there: in this case direct perceptual experience. Given 
there clearly appears to be an orange present, I can commonsensically 
consider myself to know there is an orange present. And, granted I do 
know there is an orange present, but can know this only if Olly didn’t pick 
a black ball, I can conclude Olly didn’t pick a black ball. 
 
Clearly, the above argument fails. It overlooks the fact that the backstory 
about Olly and his urn appears to provide me with a defeater for my belief 
that there is an orange before me despite the fact that my belief is grounded 
in direct perceptual experience. Beliefs that are prima facie justified and 
that may be commonsensically considered known given such an experience 
can in principle be defeated, and such a defeater is what the backstory 
about Olly and the urn appears to generate. 
 
At the heart of the Pandora’s box objection lies the thought that skeptical 
theism provides us with an analogous backstory to our everyday perceptual 
experiences. Ordinarily, perhaps I'm prima facie justified in believing, and 
indeed can be commonsensically considered to know, that there is an 
orange before me given that is how things visually appear. But if I learn 
there is a God who has complete control over my perceptual experiences, 
and that, for all I know, this God has good reason both to generate a false 
impression of an orange and indeed deceive me about the external world 
more generally, then this discovery appears analogously to supply me with 
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an undercutting defeater for my belief that there is an orange on the table. 
If I can no longer be said to know there’s an orange on the table given my 
discovery of the backstory about Olly and the urn, how can I be said to 
know there’s an orange on the table given my discovery of the truth of 
skeptical theism?  
 
Bergmann and Beaudoin suppose that to argue that skeptical theism 
provides grounds for withholding judgement about the external world and 
the past is akin to arguing that the fact that I am in the dark about whether 
Smith is an inveterate liar gives me grounds for suspending judgement 
about the truth of Smith’s assertion that (P). Beaudoin reminds us, 
correctly, that I might have independent grounds for believing (P), and thus 
grounds for supposing Smith isn’t lying about (P). Bergmann and 
Beaudoin suggest that, in the same way, I may have some independent way 
of knowing about the external world and the past (i.e. some way 
independent of inferring that God has no reason to deceive me given only 
that I cannot think of such a reason). They then insist that, granted the fact 
that I do have knowledge about the external world and past by this other 
route, I can conclude that God has not, for some unknown reason, radically 
deceived me about such things. 
 
As should now be clear, the analogy Beaudoin tries to draw with the Smith 
case fails. What skeptical theism appears to generate is not just a defeater 
for beliefs about the external world and past based on a noseeum inference 
about God’s reasons, but a defeater for beliefs about the external world and 
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past grounded in other potential methods of knowing too, including 
perceptual experience and memory. But then pointing out that skeptical 
theists don’t attempt to justify their beliefs in the external world and the 
past by means of such a noseeum fails to engage with the objection raised.  
 
Notice that for atheists who embrace the skeptical part of skeptical theism, 
no such defeater need be generated. The atheist who accepts ST1-4 is in a 
position analogous to someone who justifiably believes that while there is 
indeed an urn containing some unknown percentage of black balls, there’s 
no such person as Olly who generates a deceptive perceptual appearance of 
an orange if the ball he draws at random from that urn is black. Such an 
individual does not, on learning about the urn and its mysterious contents, 
come to possess an undercutting defeater for their belief that there is an 
orange before them given only that is how things visually appear. 
 
So, while the Pandora’s Box objection to skeptical theism might yet be 
successfully dealt with, the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails.  
 
5. Relevant disanalogies? 
 
The skeptical theist may insist there's some relevant difference between my 
situation in Olly’s orange and that in which skeptical theists find 
themselves: a difference that explains why my coming to believe the 
backstory in Olly’s orange generates a defeater for my belief that there’s an 
orange before me, whereas coming to believe the truth of skeptical theism 
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does not. Perhaps there is such a difference: I won’t attempt to deal here 
with every suggestion here that might be made, but I will look at two more 
obvious suggestions and explain why both fail. 
 
First, consider the suggestion that it is the role of a certain sort of 
probabilistic mechanism - pulling balls from an urn at random in to 
determine whether or not to project a deceptive image - that leads us to 
suppose a defeater is generated in Olly’s orange. But then, as no such 
probabilistic mechanism is employed by God in determining whether or 
not to give us deceptive experiences, the skeptical theist is not in a 
relevantly similar situation. 
 
However, in Olly’s orange, the urn/ball component of the backstory would 
seem to be inessential so far as the intuition of defeat is concerned. What 
generates the intuition of defeat is the fact that I’m in the dark about the 
probability of it being a real orange rather than a deceptive image that Olly 
placed on the table. The urn/ball component is included in the backstory to 
explain why I'm in the dark about that probability, but that component is 
optional. No explanation of why I'm in the dark about probability need be 
included. Alternatively, my being in the dark about that probability might 
be explained by my being in the dark about the probability that Olly has an 
all-things-considered good reason to place a deceptive image rather than a 
real orange on the table (this would obviously make Olly’s orange still 
more closely analogous to the skeptical theist’s position). Either way, the 
story generates the same intuition of defeat. 
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A second suggestion regarding a relevant disanalogy between Olly’s 
orange and the skeptical theist’s situation is that the skeptical theist may 
have good reason to suppose that God, if he exists, is morally perfect, and 
that a morally perfect God will not deceive us even if he has an all-things-
considered good reason to do so. Thus the probability that we are being 
deceived by God, if he exists, is not, as it is in Olly's case, inscrutable, but 
low. 
 
But why suppose a morally perfect God won’t deceive us? Descartes offers 
an argument for that claim in his Third Meditation, where he says God 
‘cannot be a deceiver, since it is a dictate of the natural light that all fraud 
and deception spring from some defect’, and God is without defect. But as 
Maitzen (2009) points out, while all fraud and deception flow from some 
defective situation (a terrorist about to explode a bomb who can only be 
thwarted by deception, for example) it does not follow that ‘fraud and 
deception are defective responses to that situation’ (2009, 97). Maitzen 
here follows Hobbes who, in response to Descartes, points out that it 
 
… is the common belief that no fault is committed by 
medical men who deceive sick people for health’s sake, nor 
by parents who mislead their children for their good … M. 
Descartes must therefore look to the this proposition, God 
can in no case deceive us, taken universally, and see 
whether it is true… (Haldane and Ross 1967: 78) 
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Where an all-things-considered good reason to deceive exists, our engaging 
in such deception does not require there be any defect in us. So why would 
God’s engaging in such deception require there be some defect in him? 
 
Furthermore, those who consider the New Testament a reliable source of 
information about God should note that it contains passages suggesting 
God does indeed engage in deliberate deception. For example, St. Paul 
describes God as sending some people ‘a powerful delusion, leading them 
to believe what is false.’ (2nd Thessalonians 2:11). So the thought that God 
is no deceiver appears Biblically challenged, too. 
 
To conclude this section: there may be some relevant disanalogy between 
the skeptical theist’s position and mine in Olly’s orange which explains 
why, though my belief is defeated in Olly’s orange, the skeptical theist’s 
beliefs about the external world are not. However, neither of above 
suggestions appear to succeed in identifying such a disanalogy. 
 
6. Externalism and defeat 
 
Finally, I want briefly to anticipate some other responses to the Pandora’s 
box objection – responses grounded in externalist thinking about 
knowledge and defeat. 
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Skeptical theism is usually associated with externalist epistemologies on 
which whether or not a subject is justified and/or warranted in believing 
that p is determined by factors that may lie beyond the awareness of that 
subject - factors such as whether the belief was formed in a reliable way 
and/or via properly functioning faculties. Externalists typically allow that a 
subject’s beliefs may be justified/warranted even if they lack information 
about whether such conditions are satisfied. Externalists may be right about 
that. 
 
However, from the supposed fact that you do not need information about 
the reliability of your faculties in order to have knowledge or justified 
belief about the world, it does not follow that the acquisition of such 
information cannot affect what you know or are justified in believing about 
the world. Indeed, many externalists, Bergmann included, allow that if a 
subject comes to possess information that their belief was formed in an 
unreliable way, then their belief may be defeated (Bergmann 1997: 405-6). 
 
Bergmann distinguishes three doxastic attitudes towards a proposition p: 
believing p; disbelieving p (believing p is false); and withholding p 
(refraining from either believing or disbelieving p). (He also allows one 
can also take no doxastic attitude at all towards a proposition (2005: 422).) 
Bergmann proposes that, where p*S is the proposition that S’s belief that p 
is formed in a reliable way, then disbelieving or even just withholding on 
p*S supplies S with a defeater for the belief that p (2005: 426). 
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Bergmann uses the following modified widget example to illustrate how 
withholding on p*S generates a defeater for p. Suppose Sally comes to form 
the belief that the widgets are red based on how the widgets look to her as 
they pass by on the conveyer belt. And suppose Sally has no idea whether 
there is a red light shining on the widgets or even how likely it is that there 
would be such a light shining on them. Bergmann continues: 
 
Sally now considers the higher-level proposition that her belief 
The widgets are red is formed in a reliable way. Being 
completely uncertain about whether that higher-level 
proposition is true, she resists believing both it and its denial. In 
other words, if p is the proposition The widgets are red, she 
withholds p*Sally. Does this give her, in these circumstances, a 
defeater for her belief that the widgets are red? I think it does. 
(2005: 426) 
 
So, on Bergmann’s view, a belief is defeated if one either disbelieves, or 
even just withholds judgement on whether, the belief was formed in a 
reliable way. 
 
The above principle would explain why, in Olly’s Orange, my belief that 
there is an orange on the table before me is defeated. On realizing I’m in 
the dark about whether Olly picked a black ball from his urn (and so 
generated a deceptive impression of an orange) I disbelieve, or at least 
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withhold on whether, my belief was formed in a reliable way. Thus my 
belief is defeated. 
 
So now consider Sarah, a skeptical theist, who, as a result of her perceptual 
experience, believes there’s an orange on the table before her. On 
Bergmann’s view, Sarah’s belief about the orange is defeated if, as a result 
of her skeptical theism, she comes to disbelieve, or even just withhold 
judgement on whether, her belief was formed in a reliable way. Now I take 
it that at the heart of the Pandora’s box objection lies something like the 
following thought. Given her skeptical theism, Sarah really should suppose 
she is in the dark about whether God has an all-things-considered good 
reason to deceive her about the orange. But then she should disbelieve, or 
at least withhold, on whether her belief about the orange was formed in a 
reliable way. So she should consider her belief defeated. 
 
Now, in response, an externalist like Bergmann may point out, correctly, 
that he is committed only to S’s belief that p being defeated if S does in fact 
disbelieve or withhold on p*S. Bergmann may insist that, so long as Sarah 
doesn’t actually disbelieve or withhold judgment on whether her belief 
about the orange before was formed in a reliable way, no defeater is 
generated. So let’s suppose Sarah fails either to consider the matter of 
whether her belief about the orange was reliably formed, or that, if she does 
consider it, she finds herself unable to do anything other than believe it was 
reliably formed, notwithstanding her skeptical theism. Then Sarah’s 
skeptical theism fails to generate a defeater for her belief. And so, 
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assuming the relevant externalist conditions for knowledge are met, Sarah 
can still know there’s an orange present. 
 
Does the above suggestion allow a skeptical theist successfully to deal with 
the Pandora’s box objection? I don’t see that it does. Let’s return to Olly’s 
orange for a moment. Suppose that, having accepted the backstory about 
Olly and his urn, I nevertheless continue to believe that my belief that 
there’s an orange on the table before me is reliably formed. On Bergmann's 
characterisation of defeat, given that I too fail to disbelieve or withhold on 
whether my belief was reliably formed, my belief remains undefeated. So, 
given my belief is undefeated, can I reasonably take myself to know there’s 
an orange present? 
 
Intuitively not. True my belief about the orange remains undefeated (given 
Bergmann’s characterisation). But, given my acceptance of the backstory 
about Olly and his urn (that Olly has the means to deceive me, did deceive 
me if he picked a black ball from his urn, and I'm in the dark about whether 
he picked a black ball), surely I should consider my belief defeated. And if 
I should consider it defeated, then I shouldn’t suppose I commonsensically 
know it to be true. I should be skeptical about that orange. 
 
But then similarly, if skeptical theism has the consequence that Sarah 
should, on reflection, consider her belief about the orange defeated, then 
she shouldn’t suppose she commonsensically knows there’s an orange 
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before her either. Sarah should be skeptical about her orange. And, given 
his skeptical theism, Bergmann should be skeptical about his.5 
 
Here’s a second suggestion as to how their externalism might allow 
skeptical theists to deal with the Pandora’s box objection. When 
introducing the notion of defeat above, I mentioned that we might question 
the reliability of our intuitions with respect to widget and other cases in 
which it’s usually supposed that an undercutting defeater has been 
generated. Maria Lasonen Aarnio argues that externalists should take 
                                                 
5 In fact, there’s a prima facie case for saying, not just that Bergmann 
shouldn’t consider himself commonsensically to know there an orange 
present, but also that he doesn’t know there’s orange present. In 
Justification Without Awareness (2006) Bergmann considers a case where 
he supposes a subject, Jill, clearly should consider her belief defeated given 
her background knowledge. Jill bets her brother that both their parents are 
out of town that day given what she’s been told by a reputable source. Jill 
knows that if she wins she gets $300 that will enable her to buy a bike. Jill 
and her brother now see both parents walk in, yet Jill continues to believe 
she’ll be able to buy that bike. Bergmann observes that Jill fails ‘to put two 
and two together’ in the way she should. He concludes that while Jill’s 
belief is not defeated, neither is it known. This is because, on Bergmann’s 
view, Jill’s ‘defeater system is not functioning properly’ (2006: 171), this 
being another Bergmannian condition on knowledge. Someone like Jill 
should, in a case like this, ‘put two and two together’. 
 The proponent of the Pandora’s box objection will presumably 
point out that Bergmann’s own defeater system would appear not to be 
functioning properly if Bergmann similarly fails to ‘put two and two 
together’ and conclude that his perceptually grounded belief that there’s an 
orange before him is defeated given his skeptical theism has the 
consequence that he’s in the dark about whether God has an all-things-
considered good reason to deceive Bergmann about that orange. Our critic 
will insist Bergmann should suppose his belief is defeated given his 
acceptance of skeptical theism in just the same way that I should consider 
my belief there’s an orange before me is defeated given I accept the 
backstory about Olly and his urn. Bergmann may insist there is some 
relevant disanalogy between his situation and mine in Olly’s Orange, but 
the onus is presumably now on Bergmann to explain what the disanalogy 
is. There is at least a prima facie case here for saying Bergmann does not 
know there’s an orange before him. However, see my final comments re 
Lasonen Aarnio on defeat. 
 23 
seriously the suggestion that knowledge can be retained even in the face of 
seemingly strong defeating evidence. 
 
Suppose, for example, that I judge the widgets are red based on visual 
appearance. I then come to possess strong evidence that there’s red lighting 
in play that makes non-red things look red. Suppose that, despite my 
acquiring this new evidence, I nevertheless stick with my belief that the 
widgets are red. And suppose that, as a matter of fact, the new evidence is 
misleading - in fact there is no red lighting in play and the widgets really 
are as they appear to be. Then, according to Lasonen Aarnio, I may still 
know the widgets are red. For it may be that the relevant externalist 
conditions on knowledge are satisfied (so, for example, the method by 
which I arrive at my belief may still be safe6). 
 
So why do we intuit that knowledge is lost in such cases? Because, 
suggests Lasonen Aarnio, the policy of continuing to believe, given the 
new evidence, is unreasonable. But, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, it doesn't 
follow from the fact that my continued belief is unreasonable that I don't 
know. This is an example of what Lasonen Aarnio calls unreasonable 
knowledge. 
 
                                                 
6 Safety conditions on knowledge are associated particularly with 
Williamson, Sosa, and Pritchard. A simple example of a safety condition 
says S knows P only if S is safe from error; that is, there must be no risk 
that S believes falsely in a similar case. So, for example, if Ted looks at a 
stopped clock when it happens to read the right time, his belief is not safe, 
because his belief could easily have been false. For an example of the 
safety view see Williamson (2000). 
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In what sense is my continued belief unreasonable? Lasonen Aarnio 
suggests reasonableness 
is at least largely a matter of managing one’s beliefs through the 
adoption of policies that are generally knowledge conducive, 
thereby manifesting dispositions to know and avoid false belief 
across a wide range of normal cases. Subjects who stubbornly 
stick to their beliefs in the face of new evidence manifest 
dispositions that are bad given the goal of knowledge or even of 
true belief.’ ((2010) 2) 
Consider, for example, the rule or method of belief formation that tells you 
to believe that p when you see that p even in the presence of good evidence 
for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted. This method is, in a 
sense, good, in that if you follow it, beliefs obtained as a result will be safe 
(for, given you can see that p only if p is true, the policy can't produce a 
false belief). 
However, the above method is epistemically a bad method to adopt, 
suggests Lasonen Aarnio, because adopting it results in a bad disposition. 
Lasonen Aarnio notes that a 'subject who adopts this method is also 
disposed to believe p when she merely seems to see that p in the presence 
of evidence for thinking that her senses are not to be trusted' (2010, 14 my 
italics). But then, if a subject were to adopt the method, they would end up 
believing p in a significant proportion of cases in which the evidence that 
their senses are not to be trusted is not misleading. So while the method is 
indeed safe, its adoption results in dispositions that are not knowledge 
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conducive: 
This is why the rule believe p when you see that p in the 
presence of evidence for thinking that your senses are not to be 
trusted is not part of a policy that is knowledge conducive in the 
intended sense. A reasonable subject would not adopt or follow 
such a rule, even though it is success entailing. (2010, 15) 
 
On Lasonen Aarnio's view, someone presented with evidence that the 
method by which they acquired their original belief is untrustworthy should 
withhold belief. If they fail to withhold, they are being (in Lasonen Aarnio's 
sense) unreasonable. They can be properly criticised for sticking with their 
original belief. But that's not to say they don't know.  
 
So, if Lasonon Aarnio is right, perhaps I might continue to know that 
there’s an orange on the table even after I'm presented with the evidence 
about Olly and his holographic projector. If I continue to believe there’s an 
orange there, and it so happens that Olly's holographic projector is not 
deceptively employed (i.e. my belief is actually a product of a safe 
method), I can still know there's on orange present. But then can't the 
skeptical theist suggest that, for much the same reason, Sarah’s skeptical 
theism fails to generate a defeater for her belief that there’s an orange 
before her. Just so long as Sarah continues to believe there’s an orange 
there, she might similarly continue to know (assuming the relevant 
externalist conditions - e.g. safety conditions - on knowledge are met).  
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Of course the Pandora’s box objection is not so easily dealt with. Even on 
Lasonen Aarnio’s view, it remains unreasonable for me to believe that 
there’s an orange on the table given the new evidence concerning Olly and 
his holographic projector. Whether or not my belief is defeated (it may not 
be), and whether or not I know there's an orange before me (perhaps I do), 
I should revise my belief about the orange given the new evidence. It's 
unreasonable for me not to withhold belief, not to become skeptical. But 
then, if the analogy drawn between Olly’s orange and skeptical theist’s 
position is correct, it's similarly unreasonable for Sarah to believe there’s 
an orange before her given her skeptical theism. Whether or not Sarah 
knows there’s an orange present (and she might), her skeptical theism 
should lead her to be skeptical about that orange. For, just as in Olly's 
orange, she has reason to distrust the method by which she acquired her 
belief. 
 
Here’s a third and final suggestion how externalism might allow skeptical 
theists to deal with the Pandora’s box objection. As we have just seen, the 
proponent of the Pandora’s Box objection may insist that, whether or not 
Sarah knows there's an orange before her, her skeptical theism should lead 
her to be skeptical about that orange and indeed about the external world 
more generally. An externalist may resist that conclusion by maintaining 
that what one should or shouldn’t believe depends on ones cognitive design 
plan (which specifies how ones cognitive faculties are supposed to work)7, 
                                                 
7 Bergmann offers a 'proper function' theory of justification in which 
cognitive design plans play a key role. See Bergmann (2006 chpt. 5). 
Bergmann does not actually offer the response to the Pandora's box 
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and it may be that God has designed our cognitive faculties in such a way 
that, while local skepticism about the orange is appropriate in Olly’s 
orange, we should never embrace global skepticism about the external 
world, not even if we have been presented with logically impeccable 
arguments for being globally skeptical (notice that, given we do indeed 
inhabit a world of the sort we seem to see around us, this particular 
cognitive design plan may even be aimed at truth). In Sarah’s case, unlike 
in Olly’s orange, it’s not just belief in the presence of an orange that’s 
threatened by her skeptical theism, but all her beliefs about the external 
world. But if Sarah’s cognitive design plan is such that no argument, no 
matter how good, should ever lead her to embrace that sort of skepticism, 
then her skeptical theism shouldn’t lead her to embrace it. The proponent 
of the Pandora’s box objection is mistaken in supposing otherwise. 
 
The above response muddles two varieties of ‘should’. The proponent of 
the Pandora’s box objection insists that, given her skeptical theism, Sarah 
should embrace skepticism about the external world, in the sense that this 
is what logic dictates. Now Sarah’s cognitive design plan may be such that 
she should never accept such a skeptical conclusion, irrespective of the 
strength of any argument for it. But if the force of an argument is such that, 
logically speaking, Sarah should be skeptical about the external world, 
then, surely, under those circumstances, Sarah’s design plan requires that 
she believe illogically. Sarah should, logically speaking, be skeptical, 
irrespective of what her design plan dictates. But then, if the Pandora's box 
                                                                                                                          
objection that I sketch here. It's merely a response of a sort that I anticipate 
Bergmann or other skeptical theists might yet make. 
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objection is that Sarah should embrace skepticism about the external world 
in the sense that this is what her skeptical theism logically requires of her, 
then the above response clearly fails to engage with that objection. It's that 
last italicised 'should' that proponents of the Pandora's box objection are 
presumably insisting upon, irrespective of what Sarah's cognitive design 
plan says she should do. 
 
In short, I do not yet see how the resources provided by epistemic 
externalism allow a skeptical theist like Bergmann to deal effectively with 
the Pandora’s box objection. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Bergmann attempts to deal with the Pandora’s box objection to skeptical 
theism by appealing to commonsensism and the thought that beliefs 
grounded in simple perceptual experience and memory provide us with a 
secure basis from which we may then establish that God lacks an all-
things-considered good reason to deceive us about such things. I have 
explained why, as it stands, that particular solution fails. I then examined a 
number of other suggestions as to how the skeptical theist might deal with 
the Pandora’s box objection - in particular, by appealing to (i) God’s moral 
perfection, and/or (ii) externalist thinking about defeat. None of the 
examined suggestions prove successful. It seems to me that, currently, 
there is no satisfactory skeptical theist response to the Pandora's box 
objection. 
 29 
 
References 
 
Alston, W. (1991). The inductive argument from evil and the human 
cognitive condition. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 5: 
Philosophy of Religion (pp. 29-67). Atascadero CA: Ridgeview.  
(1996). Some (temporarily) final thoughts on evidential arguments 
from evil. In Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996) (pp.311-32). 
 
Beaudoin, J. (2005). Skepticism and the skeptical theist. Faith and 
Philosophy, 22, 42-56. 
 
Bergmann, M. (1997). Internalism, externalism, and the no-defeater 
condition. Synthese, 110, 399-417. 
(2001). Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from 
evil. Noûs, 35, 278-96 
(2005). Defeaters and higher-level requirements. Philosophical 
Quarterly, 55, 419-436. 
(2006). Justification Without Awareness. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
(2009). Skeptical theism and the problem of evil. In T. Flint and M. 
Rea (eds.) Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology (pp. 374-99). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 30 
(2012). Commonsense skeptical theism. In K. Clark and M. Rea 
(eds.) Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy 
of Alvin Plantinga (pp. 9-30). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Feldman, R. (2005). Respecting the evidence. Philosophical Perspectives, 
19, 95-119,   
 
Fitzpatrick, F. J. (1981). The onus of proof in arguments about the problem 
of evil. Religious Studies, 17, 19-38. 
 
Gale, R. (1996). Some difficulties in theistic treatments of evil. In Howard-
Snyder (1996), 206-18. 
 
Haldane, E, and Ross, G.R.T. (trans.). (1967). The Philosophical Works of 
Descartes, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Howard-Snyder, D. (ed.) (1996). The Evidential Argument from Evil. 
Indiana: Indiana University Free Press. 
1996a. Introduction to Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996). 
 
Lasonen Aarnio, M. (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. Philosophical 
Perspectives, 24, 1-21. 
 
Maitzen, S. (2009). Skeptical theism and moral obligation. International 
Journal of the Philosophy of Religion, 65, 93-103. 
 31 
 
McBrayer, J. (2012). Are skeptical theists really skeptics? Sometimes yes 
and sometimes no. International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion, 72, 
3-16. 
 
McBrayer, J. and Swenson, P. (2012). Skepticism and the argument from 
divine hiddenness. Religious Studies, 48, 129-150. 
 
Moore, G.E. 1(959). A defence of common sense. In his Philosophical 
Papers. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
 
Plantinga, A. (1996). Epistemic probability and evil, in Howard-Snyder 
(ed.) (1996), 69-96. 
 
Russell, B. (1996). Defenseless. In Howard-Snyder (1996), 193-205. 
 
Segal, A. (2011). Skeptical theism and divine truths. Religious Studies, 47, 
85-95. 
 
Van Inwagen, P. (1996). The problem of evil, air, and silence. In Howard 
Snyder (ed.) (1996), 151-174. 
 
Wilkes, I. (2009). Skeptical theism and empirical unfalsifiability. Faith and 
Philosophy, 26, 64-76. 
 
 32 
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Wykstra, S. (1984). The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from 
suffering: on avoiding the evils of  ‘appearance’. International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, 16, 73-93. 
(1996). Rowe's noseeum arguments from evil. In Howard-Snyder 
(1996), 126-50. 
